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i

INCOl:IE AND HEALTH DISTRIBUTION IN THE DEVELOPHEHT PROCESS
AND SOliE RELATIONSHIPS TO OUTPUT GROWTH
A limited amount of work has been done by economists on the

economic determinants of distribution of income and the way distribution

may be expected to change over the course of time.

Some of the studies

which have looked at changing distribution patterns in a given country over
time and some of those which have surveyed a number of countries at a
given point of time have suggested that distribution bears a quadratic
relationship to the stage of development, typically growing more uneven

aa

the development process gets underway, and then more even again as the

country approaches maturity.

1

Kuznets related this sequence lareely to

structural change:fn a developing economy, in partic~lar the increasing
share of the n~n-agricultural sector \Jhich is normally characterized by
higher average incomes.than is agriculture, and, 1,.ess equal ones.

2

As

its share in total output grm,1s over a certain range, distribution will
widen, both because its internal distribution is unequal and because

its average is substantially higher than that of the agricultural sector.
Later, as it increasingly dominates the economy, the effect of the difference
in its average income over that of agricu1t-:..:.:~c i.n lead:Tng to overall
slowness will decrease, and its own internal distribution may also become

less unequal. (Different authors have stressed a number of other factors

1 see,for example, Simon.Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality"
American Economic Review, No. 45, ~'larch 1955.
2 Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations:

Distribution of Income by Size", Economic Developrnent and Cultural Chane.!,,
Vol. XI, No. 2, Part II, January 1963. In almost alJ. of the 10 countries
for which Kuznets presents data in this study, this rcI.ation was borne out.
Exceptions t·1ere the U.S. in 1950-3 (The relation has been tlie usual one
earlier, apparently) and Italy (though a oarP,inal exception).

·.

l

-2whose change over the development process is likely to affcat distributio rt,

1

but the empirical work done to date has been too scanty for any of
these to pass into the category of accepted theory.)

Enough (though not

overwhelmin g) empirical evidence has been adduced by now-consis tent with
.
2
the increase-de crease pattern of inequality over time to call for further

work on theppossibl e sources ofiit.
In view of the unhappy prospect which such a worsening of distributio n
presents to mode~n day L.D.c.•s, the ultimate question is to what extent,
if at all, such a worsening is ,.1:.J:1.evitable-0 .. liuznets b~sfc explanation suggests
that it is.

3

1

see, for example, L.B. Kravis, "Internatio nal Comparison of Income
Size Distributio n," Review of Economic Statistics, Noveml?er 1960, 42, flp.408-16;
R.J, Lampman, "Recent Changes in Income Inequality Reconsidere d", American
Economic Review, June 1954, 44, pp, 25l~·u8; H.T. Oshim:a.~ "Internatio nal
Comparison of Size Distributio n of Family Honey Income with Special
Reference to Asia," Review of Economic Statistics, November 1962, 44, pp, 439----45.
Among the possibly important factors considered are increases in
education, the transiticn from small scale to large scale enterprise,
incceasing geographic and other mobility of factor, increasing political
participati on of previously marginal groups.
2
For a discussion of some of th~ lite-ratur~ sec Richard Ueisskoff,
"Income Distributio n and Economic Growth i::i. Pnerto Ricor Argentina and
Hexico", mimeographe d: 1969.

3.

One could argue, of course, that to t~10 extent that the widen1'ing
and narrowing results from th:?. diff0rcnce :i.n avo:rage agricultura l and
non-agricu ltural incomes, there iu n spac:l.cus cor:.1poncnt in the change, if
the difference in monetary (or total measured~, incomes between the sectors
is greater than the difference in r(!al incomes~

i

·In this paper we present a simple theoretical framework giving an

alteinative (though not enti~ely·bnrelated)
interpretation of the obse1'.'Ved sequence referred to above.

Also, basing the analysis on the same explanations of how the p,rowth·process
of averap,e income per capita occurs? we analyze the extent to which a conflict

between output maximization and improvement of the distribution of incoMe
is likely to occur.
Before proceeding further~ it is useful to detail what we would

define as a "conflict" between the two variables, output and distribution~
The first point to be clarif;ied involves the difference between "pre-tax
and transfer" income and "post-tax and transfer" incone.

Relatively even

after distribution of incom~ can clearly be obtained either by havinp a
relatively even before tax distribution or effecting dist"ribution through
the government budget.

One question of interest, therefore, is the extent

to which equalization of income throur,h the tnx and expenditure policy

of the government conflicts or does not conflict with maximization of
total output.

Here the relevant concepts are transfer costs, incentive

costs, and so on--a series of phenomena frequently discussed (though less
often qualified) in economics.
-In this study, the sense in which we ask whether there is a conflict
between output and distributicn is primarily in terms of the effects on
output and pre-tax and transfer distribution of the· .use of those factors.
of production normally disposed of by the government itself or under the
control of the government and the effects of the other types of interventions
available to it.
1

Examples of this Hould be the distribution of education

It is not necessary for our purposes here to specify particular measures
of distribution as the relevant ones for this discuss:l.on. Some variable
involving a set of posit::1.ve weights on the share of lower deciles and negative
ones on the share of upp~r deciles would be appropriate.

effected by the govern~ent; the distribution of credit, the regulations
the government sets up affecting the income earning power of people
in different positions along the income profile--for example, regulations
1
affecting!large.and small fin:i.:i,;and so ono

A situation in which we would

say that the two variables were in conflict would be one in which that allocation

of factorsand use of controls by the government which maximized total output
(for example distribution of credit precisely to those lines of investment
were its pay-off to total output would be greatest) would tend to imply a

...

more unequal income distribution then would some other forms of r,overnment
intervention (including the possibility of no intervention at all); we
would say that the two are not in conflict if the most productive (in
terms of total output) directj_ons of ROvemment investment, activity and

regulation tended to favor people currently at the lower end of the income
distribution. 2
Discussions of the possibility of conflict between production maxi
mization and distribution improvement presuppose in part that fiscal redis
tribution through tax and transfer, i.e., throur,h the government budget

10ne is thinkin8 or either (a) direct participation in the development
of new technologies or of public infrastructure, or (b) the way in which
the government regulates and stimul.:.:tcs the dovelop:ne,.-.t on ne'tl technologies
and the investment of the private sector, or (c) the way the government
a:(f~cts market structures., Any goveznment po:!.icy fits into one or another
of these categories or some combination of them. The concepts fit the case
of a growing economy; the question is how poJ.ic:ies effect. the movements of
and shape of the output-d:l.otr:tbution por.sibilitj_8s curve.. In terms of a
stationary economy Uith a fixed hundle of re.sources, one would be thinking
of the relationsh1?s between 1?,overnment polides and the position on (o.r off) the
(stationary) possibilities curve,,
·
2 Really the question is the e,~":,.:n'.: o'f t lw con'"frli·
i t 1 s .. i mp 1 aus ibl e
· ct,
to assume that-· that p2rticul2.r ;::et oi: goveuuuent polic::t.c:s which gives the
maximum equality will also give m:.u1mnm output; nor is thero any general
presumption that the relation should be :i monotonic one•

'-sis relatively expensive; in other words it is not possible simply to
maximize production, forgetting about the distrmbution of income implicit
in the particular way in which production is generated, and then redistrib~ll
income as seems appropriate after the fact of the production process.

The

where
. .
relation between the two variables can be expressed irt a "possibilities· curve"; I\
quantity of distribution is somehow measured on one axis and output growth
on another; if the two are in conflict the "possibilities curve" will have
a negative slope.

Since we may assume that a community indifference curve

between the two would also have a negative slope, a tangency would, as in
a_ regular indifference curve-production possibilities curves
diagram, indicate the social optimum.

1

The distribution of income in which one is ultimately interested is
that among persons, after all intra family transfers of income ( in the

form of provision of goods and services, and any other form) primatily

from income earners to non-income earners, have been taken into account.
This means that the family distribution of income, along with a knowledge
of this transfer process and the compostiton of families would be more or

less ideal.

Distribution of personal income before such tnansfers is not

fully satisfactory, as its relation to the distribution just described is
usually imperfectly known and may change over time.

1

But the family income

The effectiveness of the administrative system would determine the
cost of-..redistribution through the budget. The relevant output or income
variable here would. be :." total output or income minus these administrative
costs of redistribution if we assumed budgetary transfer.

l

distribution by itself is also imperfect if the family composition and nature
of intra family transfers are unknown-·-also usually the case,

We abstract

here from these probil.ems, for the I!lost part since it appears likely that

the general patterns of change in all three distributions, (perconal without
consideration of intra family transfer, fe;:ily without consideration of
composition of family~ and personal after consideration of intra family
transfers) would be rather simil~r.

Broad Definition of the Variables D~termining Income Diatribution Over Time
Before tax distribution of income depends on the distribµtion of the
control of factors of production_, on their prices, and on the way in which
the factor and product markets work.
changes over time will rl,:mo.-.~
--------·--

-

(a)

'h<>C!~

Thus the way in which income distribution

""'llv on tht'P"' t:hings ~

Changes in the d:i.stributfon of ownership of factors over
time--the factors being labor, human capital,land physical
capital (both reproducible and non-rcprod:Ltcible) and possibl}?
such other factors an intnngible capital.2i3

1

The way itywhich factors a1:e defined is always arbitra't'y} and the most
fruitful way depe::nds en the issee being analysed. Th::: three f:1ctor break
down used here is by now a pop'.llar one, al though for sorne purposes it pays
to look at all income from human effort as payment to human capital. If
there is a laboring cJ.ass which received lit::J,e o~ nc investm~•nt in its
future productivity, especially inves'.:1nent pc1id fer by ttself ,, the three
factor breakdown becomes useful. iJescribing how we m::iy expect distributions
to change over time is simpler when we ac-::ept the 2.3sumpticn, probably
valid over considerable perioc~s iP.. the ::>ant, that n p;:.rscm 1 s human capital
was largelypproduceci by hi:ucc,>lf or 1.lis farr.ily-n•L,e., it c!td not involve
too much in the way of intra fa1!liJ.y tr ;:,mafers, either through the. govern
ment budset or directly.
Although this catego:ri::Gtion of fa~t.c,rs is ut'b::.tn:xy, we emphasize
that i.t ,foe$ not alt~r m .y rF.:sult, onl:-; the ea~'"' of e~,{pcr.it:i.cn is affected.
1

-7(b)

(c)

the way in which the produ ction functi on change s over time,
i e . the nature of techno logica l change , which may change
the• ;elatio nship betwee n the 1nargi nal produ ctivity of on~
factor and that of anoth er, and
the way in which any marke t imper fectio ns which exist change
over time- -this may;;ngbange the remun eration s of factor s in
a differ ent way from the way their margin al produ ctivit ies
are changi ng •1

2

(Footn ote from previo us page)
The fact that some factor s are owned by the govern ment but no
change
is made for their servic e introd uces a compl ication . (If a
change is made
then the govern ment simply enters the factor marke t like any family
and we
must ask how it uses these earnin gs.) It means that comple
mentar y factor s
rise in market price and substi tution factor s fall; thus the
curren t and future
remun eration s of factor s traded in the marke t place will be change
d as
a resilllti of govern ment invest ments , and so will the t·1ealth of
the owners
of said factor s. ·And when the produ ction functi on is define d
in physic al
units, it is also, of course , affect ed by such invest ments .
Since govern ment invest ment is an impor tant area of policy , it
would be
best separa ted out as a catego ry by itself in an empir ical study;
at
this
stage we are intere sted in a rather broad interp retat!L oncof the
change in
outpu t and distri butio n over time, so far as conc~ ptu~l simpl
icity we
impli citly treat~ its effect s under {a) and (b) .•
3
rhe develo pment proces s involv es ehange s in the aompo sition of
consum ption (as averag e incomes change ) and hence change s in the
relati ve
import ance of differ ent indus tries and, if factor s tend to be
at all indust ry
speci fic in their use, change s in relati ve factor prices . (For
an intere sting
presen tation of some of theiin teract ions betwee n changi ng demand
compo sition
and changi ng profit rates see Stepha n Hymer and Stephe n Resnic
k, "Capi tal
and Wealth in the Development Proce ss", Economic Gtrouth Cente r,
Discussiffi··:-' •·
Paper Ho. 63, 1969'). This implie s that one source of change s
in wealth distri 
bution is this ,chang e in distri bution of (espec ially human) capita
l as the
relati ve prices of factor s chan~e over time. If future marke t
earnin gs could
be perfec tly forese en and were always appro priate ly discou nted,
a skill
not yet usable would imply curren t wealth equ':11 to the value of
those future
(Conti nued on Page 7a)

-7aFootnotes continued
earnings discounted at the market rate of interest. But because
of imperfections·in the capital market, one cannot view the issue so
simply. inability to make this latent wealth liquid lowers its ·
value by an amount depending on the individual's need for liquidity.
Thus wealth distribution will normally be affected over time by these
changes.
~ootnote from page 7.

1 Ra~i1er thau t:ninking ci£ raotiopoly power leading Lo a :i:..g.1er rate of
return to capital on3 can think of monopoly profits as accuring to the
condition of having monopoly power and more or less think of this;·;{l'QWer
' as an asset or factor. And it may he noted here that the disttibution
of such power may well change considerable over time, Schumpter described
how the process of technological change leads to a position of monopoly
for the inno~ator, and the position is then eroded occurs with the course
of time. Whether the erosion occurs with any rapidity may be open to
question, but certainly the creation of new monopoly positions&is a per
manetm peatoi:enof gt'<DWth. It may well be that the distribution of this
"asset" of monopoly position charmes income distribution more over time
than does the distributi:oµ of pbµ.ical capital, for example.
Uarket imperfections are also responsible for the fact that capital
held by different groups of people tends to earn differente rates of
return; the returns different groups achieve are clearly important
determinants of changing income and wealth distribution over time.

-8A slight modificatio n of this sort of analysis would allow one to tell
another interesting story, how the wealth distributio n changes over time.
Since the wealth distributio n at a point of time is largely a result of

past income distribution s and savings functions, 1 it will in general. change
a good deal more gradually than the income distributio n does.

Much of the story with respect to the distributio n of income at a
point of time is told by distributio n of physical and human capital 2
(the latter defined as correspondi ng to the jifference between the value
of a mans effort and the value of "pure" labor, the latter being arbitrarily

defined, as indicated earlier, to correspond to the service of a person in
whom no or very little expenditure aime<l at improving his productivit y has
been made).

Correspondi ngly, changes in dlstributio n of wealth (of these

two kinds) over time ~ clearly ve.:y important in determining changes in
income distributio n over time.

In an extr~me case whe1.·e cap:i_tal were the

only source of income then the way ir.r· · wh:!.ch the distributio n of capital would
change over time would depend on the relationGhi p between income levels
\.

and reinvestmen t rates.

If savings ( or reinvestmen t) rates out of income

were the same for people at all income levels then the distributio n of capital
would remain the same and th~ dis';;ributio n of inco-;ne would thus also be
constant provided that theve wer.e not systernatic differences between the

1

The other factors in determin:.ng wealth distributio n over time are
changes in relative factor p:-ices and in the distribution of monopoly power
(where, as in the previous foot:note~ ';ve think of this as a separate asset
or source of incomc), 1_ and the rates of retu:rn to the wealth held by different
indiv¥,uals and groups.
2
.
. . . .With a definition oi: "pure" labor like that in footnote 1 Page 5,
the labor share would probably be in the ueighlJorhoo d of ?.O or 30 percent
or less for most countries over most of the developt1ent process.

rate of return to capital invested by people and their wealth levels.

1

But if those savings rates differ, for example being higher for people with
per
higherAcapita income, then the distribution of capital would become more
unequal over time, with the inequality growing faster the more the savings
rates differ and the higher was the rate of return on capital.

And if the

rate of return is a positive function of the wealth of the investor ( a likely

situation), a further tendency toward increasing concentration will be

2.5
present.
The fact that there is labor income makes the tendency for increasing
concentration over time look less strong since it appear~ reasonable to
expect the price of labor to rise relative to the price of capital over
Note, however, that if savings rates were equal for everyone, and

time.

neither pure labor income nor the rate of return to capita~ varied over

time, then income distribution would remain constant over time even though
the distribution of capital gradually becomes more even and the share of
2 (,

total income coming from capital increases continuously for each person. ·A rising relative price of labor would not assure improvement, of course,

since it would have to outweigh the two already mentioned negative

3
influences found1 in most real world situations (differential savings rates
.
~.
and differential rates of return to capital). And a rising relative price of
pure labor is not a "sure thing" since it is conceivable that po11e labor
1 In a prefect capital market there would be no such differences. except
those -.cl~e to differing levels of monopoly ··positions.
2

Proof:
Let Y be the income of individual X in year O. It is equal to L + c C0
0
L is pure labor income (equal for everyone)
Where
c is the (constant) rate of return.to capital
C is his capital stock at the initial point of time.
0

-9a-

2 Footnote fron previous paP,e continued.
His rate of o,routh of income !J.Y/Y0 depends on 6Y which equals c (6 C)
A C = s (L + cC ), where 2.. is the savin8s rate. c !::,. C = cs (L + c Co) ·
0
Thus AY
= cs (L + c Cg) =cs
,:-1hich is independent of the share of
Y
L + c C
origin~l income corning ~rom labor and capital.

2.5 Footnote from previous page
For an excellent discussion of this and related questions, see James E.
Meade, Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Capital, (Dondon, George
Allen and Unwin~ 1964).

3

Footnote from prevl8us page
In fact, empirical f.!tu4i~§ in various countries suggest that the
·· savings rate out of labor income is very low or even zero, and almost will
savings our out of capital income. See, for example Irving Kravis and
I.Fried, "Entreprene urial Income, Saving, and Investment, " American Economic
Review, Vol. 47, June 1957; Simon Kuznets, The Shares of Upjfer Incol!le Groups
in Income and Savings, New York, 1953.

4Footnote from previous
page
Although empirical evidence appears lir:iited on this, Ueade, (.Q£_. Cit.,
P• 27) presents data for the U.K. which implies that the rate of return to
. the 42% of total personal wealth hel~ by the top 1% of the population in 1959
has a rate of return about twice that of the remiining 53% of the wealth
held by everyone else.

is a substitute for human capital in such a way that if human capital
rises faster t~n physical capital,, its (pure labor's) price will fall. 1
To summarize, it appears that in the«bsence of technological change,
and redistribution through the budget, changes in income distribution over
time would be determined. pr_;l.marily by:
(a) A falling rate of return to capital and increas4ng wage rate· 0 ,f··· labor, which would tend to equalize incomes over time;
(b) A higher average savings rate for higher income people, which
would tend to make incomes less equal over time:
(c) A higher rate of return to capital for higher income people,

having the same effect as (b).
The net effect of these factors, would thus be theoretically unpredictable~
.. ·lufficient knowledge of the relevant parameters would make it predicS ch classification .
table for a given case. \;I,
a /fif. . abstracts from certain comple~it:f pa
related to differences.. in the consumption baskets of rich and poor which

may lead to changes in the distribution of real income being different from
changes in the distribution of money

income; these factors are considered

It also absffacts from demographic change over time, which may be
important if family size varies significantly with inco~e level, as it
below.

•

frequently lias.

2

1

But this possibility, while it may e:xist, does not seem to have been
important in affecting distribution measures like the Gini uoefficient
i.e., in generating large groups of people with incomes far dm-m in the
distribution. It may well, however, be responsible for the sorry fate of
smaller groups of very unskilled people in so~e advanced countries.
2
This factor has been discussed by, among others, Heade, Op. Cit.;
Herman Daly, "A ilarxian-11althusian View of Poverty", Economic Growth Center
Discussion Paper, Ho.
1970

. ···...;·•-.

...

As

mentioned

--. earlier, this very simple framework is probably

a bettex: descripti on of how the distribut ion of physical capital changes over

time than for human capital.
In the latter case, it seems probable that a smaller P'J'Oportio n of

new investmen t is paid for out of private pockets, and therefore that the
distribut ion of newly generated investmen t in human capital depends to a .sr
greater extent on governmen t policy.

A free education system ,;1ould generally

tend to be positivel y redistrib utive of human capital and vice versa.

The second broad factor uhich detemine s chan~es in income distribut ion
over time--the nature of technolog ical change--a lso presumabl y obeys certain

regularit ies which may make it possible, especiall y for countries at certain
stages in the developme nt process, to predict how it will influence distribut ion.

Marx, one of the earliest economist s to write on this issue, concluded that
there was a tendency for the capitalis t system to generate and apply labor
saving technolog ical change at such a rate as to assure that the equilibriu m
wage ( and it is probably fair to interpret him as referring to the equilibrill I!l
payment to pure labor) would be at or below subsisten ce.

of a reserve army·has not occurred in the

u.s.,

This maintenan ce

or other developed countries ;

although the sorting out of payments to pure labor and payments to investmen t

in human capital is difficul t,,it appears that even the former has risen con
siderably over time; and if it has not risen, the r1arxian result on the distri

bution of income has been avoided by a general increase in the st(!)Ck of human
capital.

A really serious question arises in thfs vein in the tlnderdeve loped

countries which tend to borrou technoloz ies not developed as a reaction

to their own relative factor abundance s;

and it seems possible that, with

this influence working, something very close to to?hat Marx referred to may

be happening, and may continue to happen in nany of tae underdevaloped

countries unless specific and strong policy measures are ~aken to counteract it.

It is reasonable to hypothesize for these countrtes that

mu:h

tech
of the

nological change i:7hich. is intiuoducecl wci·sens inccne c~:!.nt:dbutio;.1. ·· In o·:t:berc
circum:stancet: this ·might not be the caseo
Any economy has many market imperfections, and although in ge::::.c·r:.:l .a

neo-classical model with no imperfections remains a useful vehicle of analysis
it is at the s@ne time necessary in the analysis of certain problems to

focus attention on these imperfections.

Given that the de~1elopment process

tends to bring about certain market integration, enlargement of markets, im
provements in communications and trnnsportation, and so on, it seems

reasonable to posit that the degre~ of imperfections and distf;Pltions which
exist in a system diminish as developnent proceeds. lnd i: cvercll de-v~l~P,m~nt
leads to a trend towards more even distribution of income rnd socio-politica l
power; this is likely to coincide with a decrease in perBonalism--th us a
decreasing tendency to favor people because they are ftiends~ or to employ
them even though they cannot do the job as well as su2eo110 else.
are also factoi:s working in the other direction.

But there

The deveJ.opment process

involues an increasing role being played by the industrial sector, which

may tend to be more characterized by market .imperfections in both product
and factor markets than the agricultural sector. 1

On the other hand the service

1This would
be an accurate description for some ~eveloped countries,

where many producers produce eech agricultural item and only a few each
industrial one. Restrictive organizations raise the monopoly clement in
agriculture but perhaps still :}.~ave it below \tlhat in industry in most countries.
But the suggestion in the text-is probably put most in doubt by the fact that
there may be many market imperfections in underde,,elopcd country agricultural
marketing dee to transportation and communicntiou nroblems.

,\

-13sector is probably relative ly leRs monopol ized (althoug h this depende on the
~

case) and it also increase s relative to the primary sector as the developm ent

process proceed s.

As

mention ed earlier , technol ogical change continuo usly

crea~es monopoly position s, so it is not safe to assume that the average
level of monopoly will decrease because market expansio n cuts into the monopol y
power of previou sly existing monopo lies.

The effects of all these phenomena

on distribu tion obvious ly need to be analyzed in much more detail before a

general theory which would predict their implica tions for income distribu tion
changes over time could be firmed up.
In the present study, we select four of the possible sets of ?SSumpt~ons
or models one could use in analyzin g probabl e income distribu tion change over
time in terms of the above general framework ioe. where change

results

from (a) change:i.in the distribu tion of wealth~ (b) the nature of technol ogical
change and (c) changes in market impe.rfe ctions.

Our goal is not so much

to predict in each model which may distribu tion is likely to change as develop ment proceed s, since this depends on values of paramet ers which way would.-be
to be based on empiric al research not yet done, but rather to compara these
models among themselv es, essenti ally askin~~ other things being equal, what
is the relative path of distribu tion over time in the various models?
We make first the traditio nal or classica l division (probabl y relative ly meaning 
ful at certain stages of the developm ent

process and in certain regions of

the world) between a capital ist group and a laboring r,roup, analyzin p, the
expected change in this function al distribu tion over time as it depands
on the extent of capital accumul ation, the nature of technol ogical change,
and certain specific imperfec tions,.

This approach is more realisti c than

might appear at first sight, if one recogniz es that in many underde veloped
countrie s the distribu tion of htnnan capital is very related to the distribu tion

of physical capital--the people who tend not to have one tend also not to

have the other.

Obviously people do not fall simply into these two cate~ories

there is a continuum--but this complexity will not be considered here, in
order to keep the analysis manageable.

A second division of income-~bet:Ycen

capital income of lar~e scale capitalists on the one hand and labor and
capital income of everyone else seems more appropriate for some countries,
which have fairly widespread division of capital in small amounts; in early
stages of development this is especially characteristic of the agricultural

sector.
We use various assumptions about the nature of technological chan~e,
and we concentrate on a particular type of market imperfection,
that characteristic of the so called "labor surplus" economies--i.e .. , an
I

inequality between the marginal productivity of labor and. the wage rate in
at least some part of the economy (usually referred to as the "traditional"
sector).

He also use an alternative definition of a labor surplus situation,

being one in uhich the wage rate.· is below a·•reas·onablelevel (however defined)

with the result that a person o.annot subsist on labor income and nust either
be subsidized (e.g. by the rest of his family)_ or have some capital so that
his total income from both labor and capital is at or above the subsistence
l
level.
Income Distribution Over Tine and Output--Distribution Conflict
in a Nee-Classical Economy
We take as our first case, in view of its relative ease of analysis a
neo-classical economy with pure competition and no market imperfections of
any sort, thus abstracting from the moment from the third source of possible
1

The imputed wage within a family economic unit tn the traditional labor
surplus case is also, of course, below the subsistence level, but it is
assumed that a below subsistence wage will not actually be observed in the
labor market.
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Althou~h we shall

income distribution chanr,es to which we referred above.

conclude that the likelihood of output-distribution conflict is greater in
the case of labor surplus situation, this node! provides a useful reference
point with respect to that question also.

The changes uhich lead to an increase in production per capita (which
we take as the relevant variable rather than total production) are increases
in the capital/labor ratio~ and technGlogical change.

Under the current set

of assumptions, distribution changes over time depnnd on relative savings
<,

rates of different income groups, and the impact of the, capital accumulation

and the technolo3ical change on the relative prices of labor and capital.
In order to.analyse fully the income redfutributive impact of an increase in
output one must consider not only the impact of the change in output on the

distribution of inconezr::amonp, f.s.ctors of production but also the effect on
oonsUl!lers or users of the goods"

These two groups are the same, of course,

but it pays to analyse separately the implications for each individual as
producer and as consumer.
When the source of increasinp, output is capital formation, the implications for redistribution of monetary incom2

1

between the factor capital

and the factor labor depend clearly on the elasticity of substitution of the
aggregate production function.

With a Cobb-Douglas production function there

will be no change in the share of incor:ie going to each factor though per unit

renumerations will change and the effect uill be toward greater equality of

1
We use the term "monetary income" here not to exclude income in specie
but to distinguish it from !"eal income, Hhi.ch r.;ay change over time with monetary
income constant if prices chanhe•
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distr ibuti on.

ng share
A small er elast icity of subst itutio n would mean a-risi

of incom e going to labor , and vice versa .

The redis tribu tion occur ring due

e may not imply the
to the fact that a given perce nt chang e in mone tary ir,.co~n
of labor incom e
same perce nt chang e in purch asing power for the recip ients
ences in the typic al
and the recip ients of capit al incom e depen ds on differ
by earne rs of
market baske ts consumed by earne rs of capit al incom e and
labor incom e.

those
As capit al accum ulates , relat ive ~rice s will fall for

for those relat ively
produ cts relat ively inten sive :f.n capit al and will rise
has the ~elat ively
inten sive in labor , so which ever incom e-earn ing group
ively capit al inten sive
highe r propo rtion of its bnndl e of goods produ ced in relat
its incre ase in money
ways will have an incre ase in real incom e great er than
ant).
incom e (assum ing that the overa ll pr:i.ce le-,1el stays const
e, then -0.eut ral
If the sourc e of incr~a sinp: outpu t is techn oloP, ical -chang
tribu tion of mone tary
techn ologi cal chane;e impli es that the.re wj_ll be no redis
;eneous of any degre e.
incom e impac t as lonr, ac the p1:odu('.ition funct ion is hcmoe
cal chang e (c::-!e defin ition s
And under these circum star.c es, labor savin g techn ologi
~if elast icity of subst itobelow ) would lead to an incre ase in the labo1: share
it tende d to be low; the con
tdC:,n· .tende d to be high, and a decrP..i:1se in it if
be th~ oppos :!.tc.
clusio ns for capit al savin g techn olc\~i cal chang e ,:ould

The

funct ion is not ~Qmogen~ous.
n:rtcture is more comp licate d if the produ ctio::1
a techn oloBi cal chang e
To determ ine the incc~ e redi3 tribut :lon ir,1?act of
ologi cal chang es with
one has to defin e labor savin g and capit al savin g techn
e forrus of techn ologi cal
some preci sion. There a.•:e two b2:3:.:.c w.:'.ys in_ which s:l.mpl
leave s the isoqu ants
chang e can be defir.. ed; one inv'.llver; a type of chtmg e which
ng to each one.
the same as befor e, but incre ases the outpu t corres pondi

This means that at a given unch~nged factor endowment, the technoloP,ical change
will leave the marginal productivity ratio of factors the same, and thus their
shares in total income also stay the same.

A twist in the shape of the iso

quant at the point corresppnding to the economy's factor endownent such as
to imply a lower price for capital relative to labor can be called capital

saving technological change; if factor prices had stayed at their oriP,inal
level, individual entrepeneurs would have increased their use of labor
and decreased their use of capitai. In this case capital savinP, technological

change would definitely decrease the total share of income going to capital;
and labor's share would fall \vith a labor saving change.
Another possible definition of neutral te 0hnolop,ical change is one in
which it is assumed that each point in each isoquant shifts inward by the
same percent.

This is the same as saying that each quantity of output now

re~uires X percent less of each of the factors previously required to
produce it, regardless of the factor proportions originally used to produce

it.

When the production function :ls not homogeneous, this sort of neutral

change can affect the marginal rate of substitution between the two factors
at the factor proportions correspondinp, to the economy; if for a given pro
portion of capital and labor, the ratio of the mar~inal prodcctivity of capital

to that of labor rises for isoquants corresponding to higher output £evels

then there will be an increase in the ratio of the marP,inal productivity of
capital to that of labor uith, an effect the same as previounly resulted from
labor-saving technological change,

In tenns of this deEnition of labor

saving and capital saving technological change, the chanP,e would have to be
capital savin~ in order to leave the shares of the two factors constant.

Conversely if for a given proportion of capital and labor, the ratio of marg:l.nal
productivity of capital to that of labor falls for isoquants cor~espouding to
higher output levels, the chauge would have to be labor savi.1g to leave factor
shares constant.
These last paragraphs bave referred to shares in monetary terms.

The

implications of the natu::e of technological chanp;e through the way it affects
the purchasing power of a eivan :!mount of money to each of the two groups depends
in this case on whether that change is mor,~ rapid in the 3oods typically consumed
by the earners of labor income or those ·aonsumed by tha earners of capital income.

In empirical terms, it is not cleai whether ~apital acccmulation and
technological change as they typically occur tend to inct·ease the real purchasing
power of a given amount of money for the labor earners or the cspital earners.
Capital earners tend ':o con::;ume modern pro.d1..1cts -· electrical prod~1cts, automobiles,
and so on - a number of which are relatively capit~.1 intensive, bat at the same
time they tend to be heavy consumers of personal services which 2t leant are

physical capital ncn-int~nsive.

Technologica.l change tends to be concentrated

in physical products rather th,:m in se::vices, so th~re :i.s no oin:ple I!-. priori
answer as to which group·will be favc,rcd"
;.

Whenever either the capital accumulation process or the technological
change process leads to a chaaee in relative prices, a full g:::neral equilib1·ium

analysis would have to be un,~d to analyze t:he indirect effects of these tendencies
towards price changes by looki~g at the factor proportions and consumption pro
portions of all goods relatrd in production or ir. consumption with those whose
relative prices had the original tend.~ncy to clrn.rp;co

Three Labor Surplus Cases
One of the most strikins characteristics of many underdeveloped countries
is that they do not fully fit the nee-classical model which forms the framework
of the above analysis.

And one of the most important ways in which they do not

fit it is in the existence of some form of surplus labor, a situation which

leads to the marginal productivity of labor being different in different sectors
of the economy, in particular between sectors which in general use a profit
maximizine criterion in the decision as to how many workers to employ, and other
·sectors where people are self employed or orP,anized in family units,1do not have

enough complimentary factors to cive them very hiph marginal products, but do
not lose their employment as a result.

The traditional picture of this

situation may be portrayed as in Figure 2.

There is a modern sector which

equates marginal producticity and s~lary, and a traditional sector in which

are employed all the workers who do not gain access to the modern sector.

In

an economy with a great deal of excess labor the marginal productivity of that

factor may be zero or negative.

In Fisure 2 we assume that the wage level in

the modern sector is given by SS , the amount of labor in .that sector is OL0 and
1
that Nie amount of labor in the rest of the economy is L. 10 • This model we will
0

refer to as the first labor surplus model or LSH#l.
The implications of this labor surplus situation for static inefficiency
(in terms of failinp, to achieve maximum po,tential output) and for distribution

of income depend in part of the production ~elationships in the economy and
in part on the details on the behavorial pattern of people in the so-called
traditional sector.

Labor surplus theory has usually assumed, either imnlicitly

or explicitly, that there is some relationship between the salary at which people
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are willin g to work in the modern sector and the income they derive
the tradit ional sector ·.

One speci fic hypot hesis is that the subsis tence wage

income in the
level applic able for the modern sector is equal to the averag e

tradit ional sector •

With this assum ption, the static loss of proau ction in

the economy repres ented by Figure 2 would be the area AL 2L0 •

Loss clearl y depend s

in the modem
on the elasti city of the margin al produ ctivity of labor curve

sector .

wage
If this curve is very elasti c benea th the level of the subsis tence

loss can be
and there is a lot of redund ant labor, the static ineffi ciency

quite great.

in
If there is, r,iven equal salari ~s, either a prefer ence to work

in some sense
the modern sector or not to work there, - a 11refe rence which is
be respec tively
artifi cial and perhap s due to poor inform ation, thenth e loss will

greate r or less than that sugge sted in Figure 2.
in explai ning
Two instit ution al situat ions have been most commonly mentio ned
ctivity in
how some indivi duals can earn an income above their margi nal produ
the tradit ional sector .

If the econom ic unit is the family , consis tin8 of

espec ially,
severa l worke rs, as is fairly typica l in the agd.cu l tural sector
e, it is reason able
and as long as averag e inco~e is high enough for all to sur.viv
are really necess ary.
to assume that no one will be t1.rr::ned out becaus e less hands

This situat ion we Will refer to as the family instit ution case.
it has been propos ed that in more or less feudal agricu ltures ,

Altern ativel y
the o~mer may

ize his profit s feel a respon sibi_li ty to suppo rt more worke rs than would maxim
11
this we refer to as the "noble sse oblig'l:! case.

T.Je

turn below to the questi on

betwee n these two
of how income distri butio n chanp,e over time is likely to vary
surplu s situat ion
subcas es of LSli#l , the neo-c lassic al model and the other labor

to be considered ~

But first we outline briefly the statics of the lat_ter which

we will refer to as labor surplus model two (LSJ~/12).

It differs from the first

one in that we assume labor is paid itsmargin al product in all sectors, even
though this payr.ient is below the culturall y or physicall y defined subsisten ce
minimum.

Thus the institutio nal situation implies that people will work in

the modern sector at wa~es less than the average productiv ity of labor in the
tradition al sector.

This assumptio n correspon ds essential ly to a situation where

the family is the economic entity whiah naximizes income, rather than the in
dividual as in the case above.

If this sector were, as is frequentl y assumed,

made up of family economic entities with a number of people in each family

(for example the father and a group of sons) then it is clear that in order
to maximize family income the optimal behavior would not be to send a son to
work in the modern sector only if the wa~e rate there were equal to or above

the average income per person in the family in the tradition al sector, but rather

to send him there at any salary above the rnarp:inal productiv ity in the tradition al
sector; if that marrinal productiv ity is 0, the son should theoretic ally
work in the modern sector if h_e can p;et a positive ~-Tage at all.

P,o

to

While this

theoretic al extreme is iMpossibl e for a variety of institutio nal and other
reasons, possibili ty of a wage below subsisten ce cannot be neglected , especiall y
in societies where family relations hips are closely nair:.taine d even after a person
moves from a rural to an urban area, or o-oes to ·work on a different farm or
artisan entity frot1 the one his father runs.

Since the latter two moves do not

even necessari ly involve reor,ra~hi c separatio n, their feasibili ty can the less
hP denied a prior_~_.

If tlds latter assumption were actually to hold, the existence of surplus
labor

1 would not necessarily imoly any static inefficienc y although this extreme

case would be unlikely since the ,rnp:e rate would have to fall to zero if the
marginal productivit y i;ere zero in the traditional secto,:-.

At any rate, to the

extent that some people accept uar:es belorr the avera~e income of the economic
entity to which they belonr, sof'.1.e of t!:J.e static inefficient y loss is cut out.
1
Relative Income Distributio n Paths in the Three :• odels

The way in which the distributio n of incone between ca!)ital and labor chanr;es
in the course of econot.1ic develomnent is of interest whey,_ it may be reasonably
assumed that individual families tend to have incoue ·fron only one of the two
factors.

This is a reasonable assumption in the Modern sector qhere the

car,italists and t 1·1e workers are usually rather clearly defined p:roups.

nut it

is not necessarily the case in the traditional sector, uhere we are frequently
talldnp, aliout sr:1all scale farmers who1 altboup:h they do not ooerate very much
land, do at least

Olm

it, or snall scale artisans with sinilar characteris tics.

In these cases each of these econonic units has sone labor income and some
capital income; one night in:-pute the latter evenly ar1onr· all the nenbers of the
unit.
~

In a nee-classic al r:1odel, and especially uhen developr::ent has ')roceeded to

point where a~riculture and small scale 5.ndustry are r.elatively unimportan t,

the breai:dm7!1 of income betPeen cay,ital and labor May be T,'eanin.c;ful, in that
people tend to have nost of their inco~e _:Fror:'. only one o'!: the factors.

But it

could not correspond to a distributio n b~r tvo ~rouns of faMilies either in LS!~/!2

1 m1ere

define a labor surT)lus econom? as one in ,1hich the r,arrinal
product of labor uas belor 1 the subsistence level, houever defined.
ire
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nor in the LSMl/1 family institution case.

It I'li.s:ht, del')endin8 on how we define

labor incor,1e, be !'leaniilp:ful where the institution by whict, neo!)le whose narginal

productivity was belo~, their incoF1.e Pere subsidized ~•as throu~h "noblesse oblip:e"
landlords instead of their own family.
Although the labor-capital income breal:down has interest only in some
of the cases we uish to compare, we ta1-::e a look at it as a first step toward a
more satisfactory division, i.e. Pe consider the relative trajectories of the
share of igcome roinr to labor in these cases basically as a reference point

for subsequent considerations. :i;'or the "noblesse oblip;e" case, ue assume that
the capital income in the traditional sector (defined as total income minus the
number of workers times the subsistence Hare) corresponds to a specific r:;roup
Q1).J\¢@f

whom leave that sector until the econo'M.y has left the labor surplus

situation.

He trace out relative distribution r,aths for the 4 cases in question,

even though, as noted above, in only two could this ilistribution directly refer
to family groups.

Fir,ure 3

incorporattes
:he relevant assuMptions rr.ade about the economies used in

the comparison.

He assume that each of the four economies "starts" with a r.:iven

averap:e incorie per capita and we then consider for which ones the labor share is
likely to be hisher at the start, and what the relative trends are likely to
be thereafter, both of the absolute labor income and o'f. lahor I s share of the
total pie.

In Fir,:ure 4b ue plot the al'l.ount of income derived frorn labor in the

four cases as a function of avera?:e incoI'"le per capita; thus when the curve for
one economy is hir:her than that for another, its labor share is hir,;her.
share itself is plotted in Fi~ure 4a.

Labor

The two marginal productivit y curves of Fir,ure 3 (EL1 for the modern sector
and FL

2

for the traditional sector) define for us in the case of LS'r//1, a total

amount of income by which we arbitrarily define· the "startinr, point" or basic

level for all four cases; that level is equal to OEAL 0 plus O'FL 2 •

The amount

of labor income in the noblesse obli?,e case would h'e SsAt0o (from the modern
1
sector) plus ASs'O'Lo (from the traditional sector) , indicated in Fisure 4b as

oz.

The amount of labor incor.:ie in LS!f/fl family institution case - would be only

SsAL 0 if we stick strictly to the lopic that no labor income is imputed unless
0
the marginal productivit y of labor is positive. Thus the curve (Fir,ure 4
representin 3 labor income for this case starts (at· O"t) below that· of.the noblesse
oblige case but the same narginai productivit y curves would apply in each case.
Given model LSt'/12, and assurnin~ the same avera~e incol'!le per capita at the
startine point, at least one ~r both of the narpinal ,roductivit y curves for the
tuo sectors must differ from those assumed for LSH/11.

This is so because the loss

of potential production AL11 0 which occurs in LSl!lfl does not occur in this case.
There is, of course, no pair of curves uhich have a "correct" relation to those

used for LSH/11.
1

But trying to nake the cases as parallel as possible, we may

1n this case, of course, not all of the W;home :-7oinp to workers in the
traditional sector is generated by their mar~inal Droductivit y, but for oresent
purposes we define the subsidy received by workers as labor income since it rest•.lts
(albeit throu)jh an unusual route) from the individual' s status as a laborer. (In
the case of LS~lf#l, uith the family-shar inr institutior. , it seet"ls more convenient
to define the difference betHeen income and rnarp:inal productivit y of the surplus.
laborers as income resultinrr either from their status as co-owners of capital, or
as members of a farnily. Admittedly the latter case :.ay be very close in nature to
the noblesse oblir,e situation, though it seeMs lil:ely that the landm-mer in the
latter situation will feel resnonsible for providin"' sul;sis tence only when the
workers are on his land and in the former case the faITTily would probably interpret
its responsibil ity as roinb farther).
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-24reason able to assume that one or both of hte curves is, over the full range
of L, a little below those for LSMl/1.

Reason ahle differe nces in the relativ e

positio ns of the curves in the two cases will not alter the results much.
Assuming surplu s labor at the startin g point (in the.sen se that with all
the labor used its margin al produc tivity is zero in both sector s) then the
initia l labor share is equal to zero as indicat ed in Figure 4.
The margin al produc tivity curves for a neo-cl assical model with the
same total average income as the above ones and with an equilib rium wage
level which is at least as high as Ss must again be somewhat differe nt.

It

seems reason able, for the sort of analys is under way he~e to try to alter
the curves for two sectors as little as possib le given the restric tions.
Thus we have drawn the curves GL 4 and HL5 , which cut precis ely at the level
S ; any other neo-cl assical model witl1 the same total income would start
8

with a higher labor share; this one is therefo re an extreme case in this
respec t; it starts out with the same labor share as does the nobles se oblige
case of LSH/11.

We are implic itly assumin g that that model is neo-cl assica l

not becaus e any basic institu tions are differe nt but becaus e margin al
produc tivity of labor is higher given the same total output as in the other
of
cases, thus implyin g that neithe r the intra- and inter-f amily subsid ies
the LS11/ll cases nor the widesp read owners hip of eapit.a l of LSH//2 exist
to keep everyon e alive.
Just as in the definit ion of "paral lel" repres entativ es of the four
types of econom ies consid ered, with each Benera ting the same total amount

growth
of income there is some arbitra riness , the same is true as we define the
four
process (shifts in the margin al produc tivity of labor curves ) for these
econom ies.
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A fairly meaningful Yay to define parallelism in this sense might be the
following.

First, assume a basic expansion process in the growing sector (in

the labor surplus cases the "modern"·:sector) of the neo-classical model1
correspondinc to the assrmnption that technological change is neutral and that
the production function is Cobb-Douplas, so that factor proportions do not affect
the labor share.

2

Thus the labor share in this model remains constant as average

income per capita r,oes up.

Then we arbitrarily define parallelism of the

growth process across the various models as meaninc that the marginal product

of labor curves of the modern sectors of all the economies m~ve out by the same
¾1e follow here the convention of labor supnlus economics in assumin8 that a11·
capital foroation and technolosical chanpe occur in the ~odern sector (which
· is usually interpreted as consistin~ of a lar~er share ot the industrial sector
than some others, such as the a~ricultural sector. Comparinr, the labor surplus
cases in.th the nee-classical one creates an awkwardness here, since the latter
has no traditional sector in the sense of the term aoplied in labor surplus
economies. For expositional simplicity, nevertheless, lJe have assumed two
sectors in the nee-classical economy as represented in Figure 3, and we \-.Till
assume that growth occurs in only one of them. This does not, given the other
assumptions we are making, alter any results.
2

Note that if the only cause of the expansion of the pro-c~uction possibilities
in the growing sector is (Hicks) neutral technoloP:ical chanp,e, then the mar~inal
product of labor curve in this sector shifts vertically by the per cent of the
technological change. If the sole cause is capital formation, then the move
tends to be more horizontal. The curve does not shift on the vertical axis
at all if the change is such that the mari;inal productivity of capital with only
one laborer is O. It shifts only for quantities of labor ideh enough so that
the marginal productivity of capital is positive.
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relative rates for any two rays passing throur,h the origin.

1

(After discussinB

the results implied by these assumptions, we try to explain why they are
reasonable ones).
We discuss now the relative over time patterns of distribution, having
defined a situation ~-rhere the labor share in the neo-classical economy is
constant.

In the noblesse oblige case absolute labor incone would not rise
-

at all until total income

of

2

had gone up enough so that the marginal productivity

labor curve of the modern sector had shifted enou~h to cut the other

tnarginal productivity curve at the subsistence wap,e level Le. until the
the
surplus labor was exhausted;lal:,or share would, of course, be fall.in~, during
this stage as indicated in Fi 0 ure 4.

After this (conmercialization) point is

reached, average wa8es would start to rise and uould tend to rise faster than in
the nee-classical case, with labor share therefore rising.

The absolute income

in this model roinr, to labor could (dependinr, on the details of the curves and
the way they moved) eventually rise above that in the·--.neo-classical model with

the same, (by definition} beinp true of the labor share. For LSW/1, far.1ily
labor ceases to be redundant;
institution, labor's share falls at least u~ to the point whereAabor income in
the. modern sector rises durinr: this period, both because the n.··"''Jer of workers
is rising and because the war:e rises as APL int-l}rtraditional sector rises; its

1Thus if we take any new

JfPL curve for the neo-classical economy, correspondinp
to a new level of incot'le, the ratio of the outtrnrd movement alonr; ray A to that
of along ray ri l·lill be the same as that bebreen two ~IP1 curves correspondin8 to
these same tim incone levels in the h1bor surrylus case. IJote that the relative
percent shift ray be different in the ttm cases; uith a p:iven percent technological
change income r.iay grow faster in one model than another, but our interest is in
the labor share at a given per canita incone; we are not here interested in the
efficiency pro~erties.

2
we do not consider here the implications of the fact that there may be a
change in the relative prices of fl'oods typically Produced in the•modern sector
and those typically produced in the traditional sector. The implications would
tend to be similar for all the models under consideration.

-27share in the modern sector may either rise of fall; while labor is redundant
in the tradition al sector, there is no income from it.

Labor share of tobal

output is likely to rise due to the increasin gl9 hare of tne modern sector plays

in the total economy.

After labor ceases to be r~dundant its returns in the.t::r

tradition al sector begin to rise, perhaps rapidly; labor share it then still more
likely to rise; it is jqual or greater in this case then in the noblesse oblige
1
one when the labor surplus point is reached. Beyond this point the two cases

may be expected to present similar trajector ies;--as long· as we conclude
thet total labor *f':t:..o will at some level of income be equal for these two

labor surplus situation s and for the neo-class ical situation it must 2
rise over certain ranges in the latter.

1There is a complexit y here which we brush over rather lightly.

We
wage
ce
subsisten
initial
the
that
done,
have not assumed, as is sometimes
in the tradition al sectJor will continue to govern the modern sector wage
until all the labor surplus is exhausted , since it does not seem plausible
to assume the supply price to the modern sector is related to APL in the
tradition al sector at the start but not thereafte r. If this assumptio n
is made, note that the labor shares become equal in the family instituti on
and the noblesse oblige cases of LSH/11 at the commerci alization point (i.e.
when the gap between income and marginal productiv ity disappea rs). At the
same time it seems unrealist ic to assume permanen tly that the modern sector
wage will equal APL rather then HPL in the trandtion al sector. This makes
sense as lorig as income is perfectly evenly distribut ed within the family;
and this seems raost likely as long as the family is close to subsisten ce
and virtually all is consumed. As average income rises, it seems more likely
that income of sons, brothers, etc. will fall belmi average income, e.ap.e.~
ci1illt,y if the owner elects to save, retaining all the savings in his mm
name. Further, it the original equality wage .(modern = APL. (traditio nal)
was due in part to the .fact that a migrant· from the tradition al sector
to the modern sector was not able to either retain his capital in the tra
ditional sector (and hence the income from it) or effective ly translate it
into modern sector capital, then this problem would seem likely to diminish
as developme nt proceeds and average incomes r.ise. cmr.munic ations ·improve
and capital marke~s improve.
2

A labor share, as noted earlier, is less r1eaninr•fu l here than in the other
cases since the people who consume more than their mar:>;inal porductiv ity do not
receive this incor.1e in their function as workers; the !"'.eaninef ul distribut ion
of incone in this case - that between canitalis ts (possibly. just in the modern
sector or possibly in both sectors) and laborers in the modern sector ' alonn,,
with economic family enterpris es in the tradition al sector, will be discussed
below when ,,e consider directly this oarticula r distribut ion.

For the LSM02 case the distributio n is COt'lpletely unequal (i.e. there is
no labor income) until the marginal product of labor becomes positive; this
would occur at an income level lower than that at which wai:,:es in LSNtll started
to rise above the subsistence level, (a level indicated as Yo in Fi3ure 4).
Since the marcinal productivit y curves are little different between the two
cases, it will then rise rapidly and be almost as hi~h as that in LSI1fll when
that economy leaves the labor surplus situation; from then on the movements

of the two curves t11ould be almost identical since the two rnarcinal productivit y
curves are almost identical.
Trends in the Distributio n Between "Bi~ Capitalists " and Others
In three of the four cases discussed above the share of labor was either
of somewhat dubious definition (LS!1#1 - noblesse obli3e case) or could not

possibly correspond to an income breakdo"t-m among eroups of people since the
wage rate could be below the subsii:;tence level (LSM/11, family case, and LSM/12).
In the "family" version of LSH/11 ,t~t;assume that the institution al situation
which enables labor whose mar8inal productivit y is low to set a living income
is precisely

that there. are economic entities,· either individuals or families

which have both labor and capital incoTie, even thou~h not in the modem
sector.

So althour.h knowing the time pattern of labor share and capital share

is of interest, it is not as revealin[. as a direct analysis of the probable
path of the incomes of 2roups ·which more or less correspond to rich and poor;
a reasonable approximati on to this division would seer!l to be "modern sector
capitalists" :and "others", or perhaps all"larce .scale capitalists ' and "others 11 • 1 • 2
1
Clearly the division is an oversirmlif ied one which imnlies the non-existen ce
of middle groups; but it suffices to allou a first step in the analysis.
2

If we assume in effect that there are no "noblesse oblii>e" capitalists in the
traditional sec tor, then the .in·co:ae ·of ;tha(.,othe rs w'ould ••include~ ·in·· that: c-ase,
all of the capital income fron the traditio~al sector; and one would describe this
as being between the capitalists in the modern sector and all laborers (who will
also have capital income from the traditional sector.
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If we assume, as we will below, that even in the nee-class ical model the blocks
of capital in the slow growing sector a~e small, the various models are as
parallel as possible.

But as we see, it is aJ.sv interestin g to make compariso ns

- after assuming that all capital (ioe. iu both sectors) in the neo-clas sical
economy is ~med by large capitalis tso
Assuming, as we did in the above discussio n, that the marginal productiv ity
curves correspon ding to the neo-class i.cal model indicated a higher elasticit y
of -i>otputtto\~ihllpot in both sectors under coru:i.ilderation than was the case for
the labor surplus models, and fur~he:l' assumi:ig that the share of income
generated ilin each of the two sectors j_s the same for each model at the
-

starting point, then modern sector capitalis t income must be less in the neoclassical model then in LSlUll~ since more labor is employed at the same
qge; therefore total tradition al sector inco111.e plus labor income from the

modern sector is higher in the neo-clas sical model than in the LS11fll.
it is lowest of all in the LSt~2 situation .

And

(See Figure 5)

We now assume the source of output growth in the modern sectors of
the three systems

is as befo1·e.

He find that the Ehare of income going

to the lower income group falls over ti:ne in the neo-class ical case since
labor's share remains constant but that of tradition al sector capital falls.
Per capita income of the group will rise, however.

\Jhile the noblesse oblige

model is in the labor surplus situation , the real income of the relevant
group which in· this case consi3ts either entirely of labor income, or at
least

.. " .......

included less cap:i.tal income ti.1an in the oth,=r cases, remains constant,

Their share thus falls fnster than in the neo~cl assical case.

But when

than
_ the ecanmny leaves the labor su,:plti.s situat:f .on~ the wage rises faster

in the aeo-cl assica l model so the share also rises relativ e to that in
the eeo-cl assica l case and probab ly, at least over a certain range, in
1
absolu te terms as well.
In the LSM/11 family inotitu tion case, the real income of the group
in questio n begins to rise immed iately.

It wes higher to start with than than in

... t1

10nce again it is necess ary to remember th.et in. the neo-ncl assicah ~
model there is no different;e,:1.betwcen the decisio n rules of f±rms in the
two sector s; the dif ferer.ce is rea.lly betwee n big firms which we assume
to be in the growing sector and small firms i.n the other sector .

-31the noblesse oblige case since it included all of the capital income from
the traditional sector though lower then in the neo~classical case as long as
we assume that output in the modern sector started at the same level in the
- two cases.

Tilis latter follows from the fact that the income of modern

sector capitalists is less in the neo··classical model. (i~ote that if the

appr&prfate comparison is between all income not going to the modern sector
capitalists in this labor surplus model (family unit) and labor income in
the neo-classical model, then the income distribution can be better in
the

labor surplus model, in fact it co\.ld'be bet:ter for all per capita

1
income levels. ) The income of this group may rise either more rapidly
or more slowly than in the nee-classical case.

2

In any case it will

be rising throughout as total income from the tradit~onal sector stays
constant over an initial period of while labor income from, the modern sector rises

1

rt is worth noitng here that such a conclusion as this one must be
interpreted with care. There is not the same sort of reasonsin the neo
classical economy for the same group of capitalists not to receive the
capital income from both sectors. In that case, of course, their income
would be greater in the nee-classical than in the labor surplus case.
2

The determinants of which will grow faster can be seen in Figure 6.
In the neo~classical model the wage rises as the two marginal productivity of
labor curves cut at thigher and higher levels. For the labor surplus case
under discussion, (assuming that the supply price of labor to the modern
sector equals average productivity in the traditional sector) one can draw
a rectangular hyperbolae as present in Figure 6 to indicate the way in which
the modern sector salary will rise as the marginal productivity of labor
curve in the modern sector moves to the right. During the stage of redun
dant labor (to the left of 1 2 ) the curve is a rectangular hyperbola with
focus on o1 ; when the amount of labor left in the sector is less than L20l
it is flatter than such a hyperbola. Extensive labor surplus at the starting
point will indicate that the rectangular hyperbolae describing the wage
rate for'the labor surplus model will tend to be flat, indicating a slow
increase in that variable.
But a neo-classical model with no surplus labor and the same average
income will be definition have relatively elastic marginal productivity 6f
labor curves and therefore a similar tendency for wages to grow slowly with
shifts of the NPL curve for the modern sector. And of course if one used
the traditional assumption of a constant real wage as long as there is surplus
labor, wages would not rise at all as the start in the lagor surplus case.
I,,

.,!,.'If;

throuP,h higher wages and more people employed; then as tradition al sector output
This model

falls, labor income r.ises fast enough to more thau offeet this.

gives the group of people in question a hi8her income throue;hou t, under the
assumptio ns we are making, than the noblesse oblige case, both because in the

·latter no capital income went in the group, and also be.cause the J.abor income
is higher in the former case.

(With any eiven marginal productiv ity of labor

curve in the modern sector the wage rate in that sector ,rill be higher in the

(accordin g to our earlier assumptio ns;
family entity case than in the noblesse obli~e case, since it is determine d!\ not by

where it intersect s the

CL•fve
marginal product of labor,\in the tradition al sector

For the LSM/12 case the income from labor and tradition al sector ca~ital
\

will remain constant at the amount of income earned by tradition al sector capital
(i.e. total output of the tradition al sector) until the mar~inal productiv ity
zei;o
. of labor rises above/\~pr esumably before LSMl/1 leaves its labor surplus situation )
and the labor income from the modern sector will thereafte r rise · ·quickly.

The

share of the relevant group thus starts lower than in LS!1//1 (family unit); whether
it will be below the curve for LSH//1 (noblesse oLlire) depends on the relative

size of the modern and tradition al sectors and on the earnings r.oing to
capitalis ts from af!ricultu re in the noblesse oblir;e ca.se~

J.~'!'\~-.m'!I'

ll'Jl!if.l~ @t

__Jn any case at the income Y0 , at which the nobJ.esse oblige model leaves
the labor su:rplus situation and wages beein to rise above their subsisten ce
1we mentioned earlier that ns war,es rise farther and farther, the assumptio n
that the compariso n a nerson ,-mrking ::.n the tr.:1.ditiou al sector will make is
between his total income there and his labo:- incoP.1e in· the modern sector will become
less and less realistic , as he will become presumabl y better and better adapted
to extract capital income fron the modera sector if he wants to. This complexit y
will tend to lower the position of the hyperbola e as we move to the right, and
thus lower the increase in waGe necessary to e.l:tract people in the --modern sector.

.

level, the LSU/12 model does definitely have a higher incor.ie for this croup, the
difference bein8 roughly the inr.ot:1.e at that point accruing to traditional sector
capital-.·

But at this point ~-e income is not as high iu LSH/12 as in LSM/11 (family

unit) since the wage rate is lower.

A11d the income of this group will never

catch that of LSM#l (family unit) for this reason.

tend to become smaller and smaller.

The difference, however, will

The same is true with the noblesse oblige

case, the difference will become smaller and smaller as the amount of income
accorded:/ to capital in the traditional:.. sector becomes smaller and smaller.

Thus

all three will eventually approach each other.
An Interpretation of the Empirical Evi-.:knce of Historical Paths of Distribution in

Now Developed Countries
It goes without sayine that one can hypothesize many mechanisms which would

account for a worsening followed by a bettering of income distribution over a

country's development process.

The above· disc~1ssion indicated that in general

labor surplus models are more likely to produce such a result than neo-classical
models.

In the labor surplus model where the labor shar.e would reasonably correspond

to a specific group of people (the poor) i.e. the noblesse oblise case, we saw

that labor share fell and then rose :;:-elative to that in a-parallel nee-classical
economy. (Figure 4a)

And where we implicitly took modern sector capital income

as the income of the rich then two of the three labor surplus models considered
bore this same re,le.tion·

fb

the nee-classical one (See Figure Sa).

Since

impressionistic evidence from the economic histories of many now developed
countries suggests that somethinr; like this surplus situation prevailed at times,
it appears possible that the sequences described above may have played a role in
the alleged behavior of distribution.,

VaryinR the Assumptions on the Nature of Technological ChanRe and the
-Elasticity of Substitution
In tracing out our "b"enchmark" distribution path £or the nee-classical
economy above we assumed neutral technological chan~e and a Cobb-Douglas
production function, thus implying constant factor shares, a result not important
for our purposes there since we were concerned

cmly with the relative distribution

paths of the various models.
In fact logic suggests that as labor becomes relatively more scarce (so that

the wage rate rises and the rate of return to capital falls) technological:
. change will become more labor saving over time.

And, though it is difficult to

guess at how the income share of pure labor has changed over time in the now
developed countries, it is widedy guessed (with some support from a few

empirical analyses of the sources of growth) that this share has tended to fall
over time.

1

Given the likelihood that this pure labor share has fallen in the

developed countries, the fact that this has not led to a worsening distribution
of income may well have been due to increasinn equality of investment in
human capital and greater importance of human as opposed to physical capital
over time.

A cursory look at the now developing countries suggests that labor

saving technological change is introduced at earlier stages of their development
profitability (sometimes) and
process than it was for the now developed ones, due to the ease, :prestige
borrowing from the now developed countries, to whose factor proportions it
corresponds more.naturally.

If this is true, we may.yexpect a more negative

trend in distr1l.:bution over time in these countries than that observed in the now
developed ones.

If this factor must be added to the negative distributional

tendency of growth in a country still in a labor surplus condition (already
1

See, for example, Denison.
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discussed), the future may be very bleak indeed.

We turn first simply to the

technical questiou of how the results ab~ve are altered in the various models,

ff_

the technological chan:ge is labor saving rather than neutral.

Tryinr, to

maintain parallelelism of assumptions among the various cases, and without
going into more detailed analysis) it appears that the general effect in all the
models is about the same; labor share is lower than it would oth~rwise have been,

as is the share of labor and traditional sector capital.

The stage of development

for the labor surplus mod2ls where labor share (or the share of labor and traditional
capital) was rising (assuming constant labor share iu the neo-classical model) may
therefore not be present in this case; if the technology is sufficiently labor

saving the labor surplus characteristic of the economies may never be overcome.

Labor Savinr; Technology and Likely Future Distribution in Less Developed Countries
The fact that the historical path of distribution of the now developed

countries has, at least in the later stages, indicated improvement would, if
background conditions of the currently underdeveloped countries appeared to corr
espond well to the previous situations of the former set, lead o11 e to conclude
that the negative effects of :!.abor savins tecnnolcgical chc:.nge would be more than
offset by factors working in the opposite direction. If the negative impact of
in toda"'s I,DC'J
labor saving change were greater tl,.is would be less l::'..kely; and this negative impact
f\

is almost certainly greater. The countries which develop new technologies develop
them as a response to relative factor prices; dud.ng the dc~-.rE.'\lopment of many of
these countries it appears that relative market prices of factors corresponded
more or less to relativ€! ~;ocial opportunity costs.

Thu3 the nature of the

technological change may haYe been more or less optimal in terms of maximizing

total output.

Labor share would have been greater had it been less labor saving,

but in any case fairly wide access to investmen t in human capital eventuall y
permitted the income distrib~t ion improvem ent already mentioned .
The situation differs substanti ally in the underdeve loped countries .

First

of all their modern sectors borrow much technolog y and develop little; thus the
technolog y they use at a given per capita income level is less labor intensive than
it had been in the now developed country.
of income.

This alone would imply a worse distribut ion

And as long as technolog y continues to be borrowed, there.as no

automatic correctiv e device to make the technolog ical change more capital saving in
response to this worsening .
Possible Output Costs of Improved Distribut ion
The above discussio n is anything but reassurin 8 as to the.futur e changes in
distribut ion which L.D.C.'s will undereo.

If the stage of worsening distribut ion

observed earlier in the now developed countries was due to their having some sort
of labor surplus, this problem surely character ize~ at least some of today L.D.C.'s
like India, etc. much more than it even did the typical now developed country.
And if that worsening was due to something els2 (i.e. if the now developed countries
were in fact always more or less neo-class ical) then a new negative factor will
very rapid
ine of technolog y is
thel'forrow
Further,
L.D.C.'s.
today's
in
faced
be
have to
unquestio nably a new negative factor.
In view of this, one would-exp ect that if the same nature and extent of
governmen t intervent ion in the market were to be exercised in today's LDC's as
was at the comparabl e stages of the now developed c·ountries , and the political
power of the poor were also the same, distribut ion would be worse at each income
level for the former group. This prospect, plus the tremendou s maldistri bution
already observalb e in almost all LDC's raises the question of whether some
intervent ions designed to improve distribut ion or prevent it from

-37worsening would have high costs in terms of the rate of output growth.
Promisingly, it appears that they would not, and might indeed speed growth.
The classical definition of a labor surplus situation (corresponding to our
LSM#l above) implies a static inefficiency of output (too few laborers in the
modern sector).

Any intervention which would correct this disequilibrium (e.g.

subsidies· to firms to hire more labor, laws forcing them to hire more labor, etc.)
would raise laborer's share, or that of labor and traditional capital.
of course, raise total output.

It would,

Possibly the savinr,s rate would be lowered so

that the long run effect could be negative, but an agile government policy should
be able to avoid this.
As long as labor surplus exists the market price of. labor is above its
social cost.

This factor pushes firms toward acceptance of capital intensive

technologies, which in turn lower labor's share.

An intervention designed to

prevent such adoptions in order to prevent the lowering of labor share could;
up to a point, raise the growth rate of output as well.

Consider Figure 7.

The relative market prices of capital and labor are indicated by the slope of
PP' and their relative social costs by that of SS'.
B when they should use A.

Firms will use technology

Now if a new technology C becomes available, its

adoption will increase private profits of the .industry _but lower national income
(the social cost of production being higher at C than at A).

An :f.!ttervention

to prevent_its adoption would thus avoid a decrease in output as well as a
worsening of distribution.
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